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1 Introduction
In this study, we conduct a hedonic regression analysis and investigate the quarterly
changes in the quality-adjusted prices (QAPs) of mobile phone handsets sold in
Japan between 2002 and mid-2007 for each call service operator (carrier). The QAP
is a price index measuring a subscriber's welfare by taking into consideration product
characteristics (functions and quality).1 By lowering QAPs relative to those of its
rivals' products, a carrier can gain more subscribers because its subscribers' welfare
improves on average. We discuss the QAP changes of each carrier in order to model
oligopolists' strategic determination of QAPs within an industry.
Mobile phone markets are characterized by ¯erce competition and signi¯cant
technological innovation in recent years, which makes these markets appropriate for
the application of hedonic regression to measure QAPs. Such analysis is, however,
still rare. Dewenter et al. (2006) estimated carriers' brand name premiums for mo-
bile phone handsets in the German market, but their sampling period was between
1998 and 2003; thus, their analysis could not include mobile phones making use
of technological advances allowing high-speed large-volume transmission (so called
third-generation mobile phones). Therefore, we examine the Japanese market, where
such high-performance mobile phones have been widely available since 2003.
There were three major mobile phone carriers in Japan during our sampling
period, between 2002 and mid-2007. The biggest one had a market share of more
than 50% of subscribers during this period, and the other two smaller carriers ¯ercely
competed over the remaining market share. Our main ¯ndings are (i) a decreasing
trend in QAP for each carrier, (ii) a more rapid decrease in the QAPs of the two
smaller carriers' handsets relative to that of the largest carrier, and (iii) a \turnover
cycle" of the QAPs between the two smaller carriers.
A large decrease in QAPs by a carrier that is roughly simultaneous with similar
decreases of its rival will not much a®ect its relative subscriber share, and thus large
asynchronous decreases in QAPs are possible for the two carriers that are ¯ercely
1We need a remark here to consider the QAP as a measure of subscriber's welfare. There are
subscribers who have their willingness to pay for securing a product characteristic that exceed the
marginal cost of production, in either a perfectly competitive market or an imperfectly competitive
market. (In the perfectly competitive market, the hedonic coe±cient that corresponds to a new
characteristic equals to the marginal cost, while in an imperfectly competitive market, it may di®er
from the marginal cost. We will discuss this point in Subsect. 4.2.) More importantly, di®erent
subscribers have thei r di®erent willingness to pay for it. Suppose that a product characteristic is
optional in year t, but that it becomes standardized on all products in year t+1. It is then possible
that the QAP itself does not increase, while some subscribers without their su±cient willingness to
pay for the standardized characteristic are worse o®. In fact, such a \mandatory standardization"
of a new product characteristic frequently happens in mobile communication industries.
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competing against each other. As a result, a turnover cycle of the QAPs can be
generated. This aspect in particular is suggestive for modeling oligopolists' strategic
determination of QAPs within an industry.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 brie°y reviews the Japanese
mobile phone industry and Sect. 3 describes the data that are used for our analysis.
Sect. 4 speci¯es our hedonic regression model, discussing the recent literature on the
estimation method. Sect. 5 presents the estimated QAPs of each carrier's handsets
and discusses carriers' strategic determination of QAPs. This section also presents
results from augmented Granger-causality tests. Sect. 6 o®ers ¯nal remarks on the
related literature.
2 The Japanese Mobile Communication Industry
There were three major carriers between 2002 and 2007 in Japan: NTT DoCoMo
(NTT), au by KDDI (KDDI), and Vodafone/SoftBank (SoftBank).2 During this
period, NTT had a subscriber market share of more than 50%, while the market
shares of KDDI and So ftBank were roughly 25% and 15% percent, respectively.
These carriers purchase mobile phone handsets from manufacturers, such as Sharp
and Toshiba, and sell the handsets under their own brand names to their customers
via their retail networks.3
The mobile phone handsets are \SIM-locked", so that they can only be used on
the carriers' speci¯c mobile communication network. The carriers can thus control
the con¯gurations, designs, and contents of handsets that are produced by the man-
ufacturers for the carriers. As a result, each carrier provides exclusive services to its
subscribers that are independent of the handsets made for the other carriers. Thus,
we can say that each carrier has its \own" handsets, although manufacturers provide
carriers with the handsets. In what follows, we employ this usage when referring to
handsets, e.g., NTT (mobile phone) handsets.
2The structure of the \big three" has remained throughout the 2000s in Japan, but it has
also experienced minor con¯guration changes due to mergers and acquisitions among carriers and
brand-name changes in this period. In October 2000, KDDI was established. In October 2005,
KDDI acquired TU-KA group companies and integrated the TU-KA subscribers into the \au"
brand. In October 2003, the predecessor company of Vodafone, J-PHONE, changed its brand
name to Vodafone. In March 2006, SoftBank began enabling Vodafone customers to change their
subscription to the SoftBank service. A fourth carrier, EMOBILE, started its call service in March
2008 (data communication services in March 2007), but its market share remains very small.
3There were 22 manufacturers that provided handsets to carriers in the 2000s. Between 2002
and mid-2007, the market shares of the major mobile phone handset manufacturers were as follows:
Sharp 13.90%, Toshiba 12.55%, Sanyo 11.91%, NEC 11.75%, Panasonic 10.30%, FUJITSU 8.67%,
MITSUBISHI 7.85%, Sony Ericsson 7.55%, and Kyocera 4.28%.
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As in many other countries, price subsidies have been employed in Japan since
the ownership of mobile phone handsets was introduced in 1994.4 The subsidy was
as high as 90% of the handset price, so it was common that old models released just
a few seasons before were sold for only one yen at retail, or sometimes even for free.
Of course, there was no free lunch. These carriers eventually recouped the cost of
the price subsidies through service charges, principally from call charges. Therefore,
handset sale and subscription to a service are \bundled".5 Under the price subsidy
system, mobile phone users in Japan paid relatively high communication service
fees to carriers in exchange for the deep discount of handsets: in 2006, the average
monthly service fees were about 6,700 yen for NTT, 6,610 yen for KDDI, and 5,510
yen for SoftBank (USD 1 = JPY 118), and the (weighted) average of such payments
was the second highest among OECD countries.
The price subsidy system along with the bundling of handset sales and service
subscriptions has been controversial. Opponents argue that it creates a price dis-
tortion because the true cost of a handset is hidden from consumers. Furthermore,
it causes consumers to \lock in" to a particular mobile phone network by imposing
on them a minimum subscription period, undermining competition in the mobile
communication industry.6 On the other hand, proponents defend the price sub-
sidy system because it facilitates the di®usion of new handsets with more advanced
technologies by lowering consumers' upgrade costs.7
4In Japan, retailers sold handsets to customers at a huge discount while receiving a rebate from
the carrier for each new purchase. Therefore, price subsidies are often called \rebates" or \sales
incentives" by retailers.
5Under the price subsidy system, customers could purchase handsets at discounted prices in
return for committing themselves to use a service for a minimum subscription period, for example
12 months. See the report at http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu news/s-news/2008/090626 1.html.
6The price subsidy system was criticized also for not providing subscribers clear information on
the real charges for new services. In particular, long-term subscribers of the same handset model
felt that they were treated unfairly compared to those who quickly upgraded to new models because
of an unreasonable internal cross-subsidization.
7According to Ida (2 009), the rebate system facilitated replacement of existing models with
the latest higher performing models each time a carrier launched a new or improved service, such
as Internet connectivity (NTT initiated in February 1999), e-mail with photos (J-Phone, currently
SoftBank, launched in November 2000), 3G (third-generation high-speed large-volume transmission)
services (NTT began a trial service in May and commercial services in October 2001), Truetone
(KDDI started in December 2002), packet transmission (KDDI launched in November 2003), and
Truetone-Full (KDDI started in November 2004). These services were followed by such functions as
music and movie downloading, Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation, mobile wallet (FeliCa,
SuiCa, etc.), decorating e-mails with static and animated images (Decomail), and digital television
broadcasting service for mobile phones (wan-segu). All these functions, listed in Table 2 in Sect.
3, are currently major characterist ics of mobile phones in Japan. The demand for various mobile
phone services in Japan was reviewed by Iimi (2005) and Ida and Kuroda (2009).
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Responding to surging criticism of the price subsidy system, the Ministry of
Internal A®airs and Communications (MIC), the regulatory authority of communi-
cation services in Japan, issued new guidelines in June 2007 that recommended that
mobile phone carriers lessen their heavy dependency on handset subsidies by the
year 2010. The carriers responded to the guidelines immediately, and started estab-
lishing new pricing rules: They ¯rst reduced base call charges by half in September
2007, and, by 2008, consumers' cost of purchasing a handset rose substantially. For
example, the average price of a handset for new service subscribers increased by
about 20,000 yen over 12 months between 2007 and 2008. According to a March
2008 report issued by the MIC, at the beginning of September 2007, after all carriers
had started reforming their fee structures, call charges in Tokyo were lowered by an
average of 30% compared to those of the previous year.
3 Data
Mobile phone handsets are our base unit of observation. We collected the prices
and characteristics of the mobile phone handsets of NTT, KDDI, and SoftBank that
were sold in Japan from the ¯rst quarter of 2002 to the second quarter of 2007.8
The sampling period roughly corresponds to the period from the introduction of
3G (third-generation high-speed large-volume tran smission) services through to the
time that such services had become widespread in the Japanese mobile communi-
cation industry.9 We do not use the period after the third quarter of 2007 because
the price subsidy system was in the process of being abolished, starting September
2007, as mentioned in Sect. 2, and handset pricing has drastically changed since
then.
In order to compute the quality-adjusted prices of handsets, we need to clarify
8Personal digital assistants (PDAs) with phonetic functions, so called \smart phones", are ex-
cluded from the sample pool of mobile phone handsets. They are widely recognized as products
with information terminal functions rather than mobile phones. Also, during the sampling period
covered by the present study, the smart phone market was still small in Japan, and so su±cient
data were not available. In fact, NTT did not start selling BlackBerry smart phones for personal
use until August 2008 (September 2006 for business use), to compete against the introduction of
the iPhone by SoftBank in July 2008.
9The 3G technology, formally International Mobile Telecommunications-2000 (IMT-2000), is a
family of standards for mobile telecommunications de¯ned by the International Telecommunication
Union. The principal advantages of the 3G technology is that it supports high-speed data transmis-
sion services and a greater range of advanced terminal capabilities, and so users can do everything
from sending and receiving video images to settling ¯nancial transactions using the same terminal
or handset. The 3G standards in Japan are W-CDMA and cdma2000. The former is used by NTT
and SoftBank, and the latter is used by KDDI. NTT initiated 3G service in Japan as a trial service
in May 2001 and as a commercial service in October 2001, as noted in footnote 6.
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what the \true" price of a mobile phone handset is. As described in Sect. 2, each
mobile phone handset is heavily subsidized, so that the retail price is substantially
lower than the wholesale price at which the carrier purchases the handset from the
manufacturer. Therefore, we de¯ne the unsubsidized prices of mobile phone handsets
as the values computed by aggregating the retail price and the handset subsidy paid
to the retailers by the mobile phone carriers.
First, we started with retail price information available from the Price Survey
on the Mobile Phone Watch website that is maintained by the Impress Corporation,
which collects the retail price information for all mobile phone handsets sold at major
retail stores in Tokyo and Osaka.10 Although all consumers receive a subsidy when
purchasing handsets, the amount of the subsidy depends on the type of subscription.
Generally, new subscribers have the least discount, while existing subscribers who
exchange their handsets after only short periods obtain the deepest discounts. In the
analysis that follows, for simplicity, we use the handset price for a new subscriber
as its retail price.
Second, we obtained price subsidy information from the ¯nancial reports that
are issued quarterly by each carrier, where the average subsidy amount in yen per
new mobile phone handset is available. Table 1 shows a summary of the annual
average of the price subsidy per new handset for each carrier. The values for 2007
indicate the average over two quarters.
Table 1: The Average Subsidiy Amount per New Handset (in yen)
Year NTT DoCoMo au by KDDI Vodafone/SoftBank
2001 30,000 42,000 40,000
2002 30,000 40,000 37,000
2003 31,000 36,000 32,500
2004 34,000 38,000 38,300
2005 36,000 37,000 45,000
2006 37,000 37,000 35,000
2007* 33,500 37,500 34,200
Note: * The values in 2007 indicate the average in two quarters.
Finally, we obtained the unsubsidized price of a handset of a carrier for each
quarter by matching the retail price for that quarter with the average carrier sub-
sidy for the quarter. We convert the unsubsidized price to a monthly payment by
assuming that the replacement cycle of the mobile phone handset is 24 months. In
the analysis that follows, we use the monthly payment for a handset as the base unit
of price, and call it the price of the handset.
Figs. 1 and 2 show the average handset price from the ¯rst quarter of 2002
10http://k-tai.impress.co.jp
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through to mid-2007, for the aggregated carriers and the disaggregated carriers,
respectively. All the handset prices are de°ated by the quarterly-adjusted consumer
price index for all items (base period is the ¯rst quarter of 2000). It is apparent
that the handset price, on average, has °uctuated greatly during the study period.
Although all carriers lowered their average prices from 2002 to the second half of
2003, thereafter there was no common trend in relative highs and lows.
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Figure 1: Average Handset Price for All Carriers
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Figure 2: Average Handset Price by Each Carrier
Data on mobile phone characteristics were collected from Showcase on the Mobile
Phone Watch website, White Paper on Mobile Phones 2008, and the Mobyrent
Database operated by CELLANT Corporation. In order to measure the impact of
advances in mobile communication technology on handset prices, we included as
extensive a set of handset characteristics as possible given the information available
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to us.
The summary statistics of major variables are presented in Table 2. The non-
binary characteristics, such as communication speed, camera resolution, screen reso-
lution, and battery duration, are presented in the ¯rst part of Table 2. They mainly
concern the performance or the quality of a mobile phone handset. We also con-
sider the length of time after a handset is released as the \age" of the handset, and
control for it in our estimation. All other characteristics in Table 2 are binary.11
Manufacturer dummy variables are included as the last item in the table.
Table 2: Name and De¯nition of Handset Characteristics
Variable name Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log Speed Transmission speed of a handset measured by kbps (in logarithm) 4.9503 1.7255 2.2618 8.1887
Log Camera Resolution of equipped camera measured by megapixel (in logarithm) 4.5192 0.9614 1.9459 6.2146
Log Screen Screen resolution measured by megapixel (in logarithm) 5.0208 0.1939 4.0943 5.6699
Log Duration Battery duration indicated by talk time in minutes (in logarithm) 5.8376 0.3860 4.0073 6.5511
Ringtone The number of polyphonic ringtones. 60.1965 30.330116.0000128.0000
Age Elapsed periods in quarter periods after the ¯rst release 1.1601 1.1727 0.0000 7.0000
Truetone Equal 1 if a handset has Truetone (Chaku-uta). 0.6202 0.4853 0.0000 1.0000
Truetone Full Equal 1 if a handset has Truetone Tull. 0.2093 0.4068 0.0000 1.0000
G3 Equal 1 if a handset is the third generation. 0.6566 0.4749 0.0000 1.0000
Java Equal 1 if a handset has Java application compatibility. 0.8220 0.3825 0.0000 1.0000
Flash Equal 1 if a handset has Adobe Flash application compatibility. 0.5063 0.5000 0.0000 1.0000
QR Equal 1 if a handset has Quick Response code compatibility. 0.5903 0.4918 0.0000 1.0000
FeliCa Equal 1 if a handset is equipped with non-contact IC chip. 0.1832 0.3869 0.0000 1.0000
Mobile SuiCa Equal 1 if a handset has electronic wallet. 0.1340 0.3406 0.0000 1.0000
Full Browser Equal 1 if a handset has full browser compatibility. 0.1311 0.3375 0.0000 1.0000
GPS Equal 1 if a handset is equipped with GPS. 0.2826 0.4503 0.0000 1.0000
Decomail Equal 1 if a handset has static and animated images compatibility. 0.2178 0.4127 0.0000 1.0000
Movie Equal 1 if a handset has movie compatibility. 0.6299 0.4828 0.0000 1.0000
Music Equal 1 if a handset has music compatibility. 0.3063 0.4610 0.0000 1.0000
Radio Equal 1 if a handset has FM radio compatibility. 0.1409 0.3480 0.0000 1.0000
TV Equal 1 if a handset has TV viewer. 0.3697 0.4827 0.0000 1.0000
Location Equal 1 if store location is in Tokyo; 0 if in Osaka 0.5000 0.5000 0.0000 1.0000
Manufacturer dummy variables de¯ned for 22 manufacturers¤
Note:¤Manufacturer dummy variables are de¯ned for Casio, Denso, Fujitsu, Hitachi, JRC, Kenwood, Kokusai,
Kyocera, LG, Mitsubishi, Motorola, NEC, Nokia, Pantech, Panasonic, Pioneer, Samsung, Sanyo, Sharp, Sony, Sony
Ericsson, and Toshiba.
It should be noted that not all of the characteristics presented in Table 2 were
11QR code is a two-dimensional bar code (matrix code) invented by the Japanese company Denso-
Wave. Handsets equipped with FeliCa incorporate a non-contact IC chip developed by Sony Corp.,
and Mobile Suica is an electronic wallet service for public transport facilities for handsets equipped
with FeliCa. Decomail is a service that enables the use of more advanced e-mail features, including
static and animated images, by supporting the compact HTML (cHTML) standard. Decomail has
rapidly become popular in Japan. In July 2008, SoftBank began selling the Apple iPhone 3G,
but the sales have not increased as quickly as expected. A major reason is that the iPhone lacks
many popular functions such as Decomail, Mobile SuiCa, and digital television broadcasting service
(wan-segu).
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observed through the entire sampling period. Due to the rapid growth of mobile
communication technology in Japan in recent years, many new features have been
introduced to mobile phone handsets. For example, Truetone (Chaku-uta), which
is a service that transforms the ringtone of a handset into a piece of music, was
¯rst introduced in new models released by KDDI in the fourth quarter of 2002.
Truetone-Full is an extended version that covers almost the full length of a song. This
service has been rapidly spreading to almost all handsets, but it was not available
on any handset before its release.12 The introduction of new technology produces
the so called \new characteristic" proble m of price index computation, which will
be discussed in detail in the next section (Sect. 4.2).
By using a dummy variable for third generation, we can observe the transition
from second- to third-generation mobile phones. Third-generation mobile phones
accounted for 10% of all handsets at the beginning of 2002, but their share increased
to nearly 95% by the second quarter of 2007. The share increased drastically in 2007
with the dissemination of digital television broadcasting service (wan-segu).
4 Estimation Method
4.1 Hedonic Regression Analysis
Two hedonic approaches have been widely employed to measure the quality-adjusted
price index: the hedonic imputation indexes approach and the time dummy hedonic
indexes approach. (See Tripplett 2004 for details.) Both approaches are based on
hedonic price regressions. Let the price of handset i at period t be pit. The hedonic
price regression takes the following form as a function of the characteristics:
log(pit) = ®t +
JX
j=1
¯jtxijt + "ijt; (1)
where xijt represents the j-th handset characteristic of handset i in period t. This
variable is log-transformed when it is a non-binary characteristic.13
The hedonic imputation indexes approach is based on the interpretation that
the coe±cients of the hedonic regression represent the implicit prices of the char-
acteristics. One can use the following price imputation measures, which are the
Paasche-type price index and the Laspeyres-type price index. As shown in Berndt
and Rappaport (2001), the Paasche-type price index for period t relative to period
t¡ 1 is computed by
12The share of handsets supporting Truetone was 28% in 2003Q4, 58% in 2004Q4, 86% in 2004Q4,
91% in 2005Q4, and 95% in 2007Q4, respectively, where Qi indicates the i-th quarter of the year.
13See, e.g., Berndt et al. (1995) and Berndt and Rappaport (2001).
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pPASt;t¡1 =
pt( ^¯jt; ¹xjt)
pt¡1( ^¯jt¡1; ¹xjt)
(2)
where pt( ^¯jt; ¹xjt) and pt¡1( ^¯jt¡1; ¹xjt) represent the year-t and year-(t ¡ 1) charac-
teristic prices at the year-t average characteristic ¹xjt, based on the estimated ¯jt
and ¯jt¡1, respectively. The corresponding Laspeyres-type price index for period t
relative to period t¡ 1 is computed by
pLASt;t¡1 =
pt( ^¯jt; ¹xjt¡1)
pt¡1( ^¯jt¡1; ¹xjt¡1)
: (3)
Once the price imputation measures are computed between two adjacent periods,
the quality-adjusted price between the base period 0 and period t is computed by
\chaining", i.e., by successive multiplication of indexes between periods 0 and 1, 1
and 2, ¢ ¢ ¢ ; t¡1 and t. In general, though, the Laspeyres-type index and the Paasche-
type index do not coincide, diverging to the degree that the average characteristics
change over time. So, both types of indexes should be computed and be combined
with each other using, for example, the geometric mean (i.e., a Fisher-type price
index).
The time dummy hedonic indexes approach, on the other hand, uses the fact
that the coe±cient of the dummy variable represents the quality-adjusted price
change between the base period and a subsequent period. This method has been
popular because of its simplicity. One usually pools cross-sectional data of period t
and subsequent periods, say t + 1; t + 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; t +K, and estimates a variant of the
regression model (1) with time dummy variables: for s = t; t+ 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; t+K,
log(pis) = ®t +
KX
k=1
®t+kDt+k +
JX
j=1
¯jtxijs + "ijs; (4)
where Dt+k is a dummy variable that takes one only when the period is s = t + k.
We assume that the coe±cient ¯jt is constant during the pooled periods between
s = t and s = t+K. Then the quality-adjusted price of a handset between periods
t and t +K is computed from the estimates of the coe±cients of the time dummy
variables through the following formula:
pTIMEt;t+K = exp(®^t+K): (5)
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4.2 Empirical Strategy
Which one of the above two hedonic approaches should we use to compute the
quality-adjusted prices of mobile phone handsets? In the case of the Japanese mobile
communication industry, we ¯nd that the time dummy hedonic indexes approach
seems preferable to the hedonic imputation indexes approach because the latter
su®ers from the \new characteristics problem" that was pointed out by Triplett
(2004).
To understand this, consider a situation where a new binary characteristic, say
Truetone, is introduced to a new mobile phone handset in period t, while it is not
available on any handset for periods 0 to t¡ 1. In this situation, it is impossible to
compute the Paasche-type index (2), because the estimate of the coe±cient of the
characteristic, or equivalently, the implicit price of the characteristic, is not available
for the previous period t ¡ 1. One may compute the Laspeyres-type index (3) by
using the weight of the characteristic as zero at period t¡1. Yet, this can introduce
serious bias to the quality-adjusted price because this ignores the value added by
the arrival of the new characteristic (Triplett 2004, p.85). One can thus conclude
that the hedonic imputation indexes approach is inappropriate for estimating the
quality-adjusted price of mobile phones in Japan where new mobile phone handset
characteristics have been introduced continuously.
The price index based on the time dummy hedonic indexes approach, on the other
hand, does not su®er from the introduction of new characteristics. It is common
for old handset models without some new characteristic to continue to be sold, at a
substantial price discount, in the market for some time after new models with the
characteristic have been released. This implies that the time dummy variables in
the hedonic regression are not collinear with the dummy variable that represents a
newly introduced characteristic. Thus, the time dummy hedonic regression model
(4) can be estimated from our data. Taking all these points into consideration, we
therefore base our analysis of the quality-adjusted price of mobile phone handsets
on the time dummy hedonic regression method in the following empirical analysis.
Of course, as is frequently pointed out in the literature, the assumption of time
dummy hedonic regression regarding parameter stability across pooled periods is
unrealistic and restrictive. Whenever a new characteristic is introduced in the mar-
ket, a new non-trivial variable is added to the set of independent variables in the
hedonic regression so that the structure of the regression changes.
In order to address this issue, we set up a recursive test procedure to examine
the stability of the slope coe±cient over time: we start the F test from two adjacent
quarters of period 0 and 1, and if the null hypothesis of no structural break is not
rejected we repeatedly expand the periods by adding a new period until the null
11
hypothesis is rejected by the F test. Once the null hypothesis is rejected at, say,
period t0 (¸ 2), we conclude that periods from 0 to t0 should be pooled for the hedonic
regression, and we restart the F test from the subsequent two adjacent quarters of
period t0 and t0 + 1, recursively.
The results of the recursive F test procedure suggest that no more than two
adjacent periods should be pooled for the aggregated carrier data.14 In many cases,
structural breaks occur due to the introduction of new characteristics. But in other
cases where characteristics are unchanged over consecutive periods, the null hypoth-
esis that coe±cients are stable is rejected at the 5% signi¯cance level for any pooled
periods.
We therefore opt for pooling only two adjacent quarterly periods, and run the
regression for each pair of combined adjacent periods. Then the hedonic regression
model is given by
log(pis) = ®t + ®t+1Dt+1 +
JX
j=1
¯jtxijs + "ijs; (6)
for the two adjacent periods s = t and t + 1. Requena-Silvente and Walker (2006)
call this type of hedonic regression adjacent period regression. Given the estimates
of the adjacent period hedonic regressions, the quality-adjusted price between the
base period 0 and period t is computed by the following chaining rule:
[QAP t =
tY
s=1
exp(®^s): (7)
It should be noted that the adjacent hedonic regression (6) we implement here is
not \weighted". Because the product share information of each handset model, in
either sales or revenues, was not available, we could not adjust the hedonic regression
by quantity or expenditure weights. Although the computation of quality-adjusted
prices based on unweighted hedonic regression is common in the literature (e.g.,
Berndt et al. 1995; Berndt and Rappaport 2001), the interpretation needs some
quali¯cation in terms of the representativeness of the data: quality-adjusted prices
between the base period and reference periods based on unweighted hedonic regres-
sion are interpreted as price changes of the average handset model rather than the
price change of an average transaction.15
14The results are not reported but are available upon request.
15Only the shipment share of handsets by manufacturer was available, so we implemented hedonic
regressions weighted for manufacturer quantity. Based on the weighted least squares estimates, we
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The last issue of concern with the hedonic regression is the possible existence of
price markups due to imperfect competition on the supply side of the market. In
a perfectly competitive market, which is assumed in the traditional hedonic regres-
sion model, the estimated coe±cient of the hedonic regression can be interpreted
as the consumers' marginal evaluation of each characteristic of the good (Rosen
1974). On the other hand, in an imperfectly competitive market, where the price
exceeds the marginal cost, the hedonic regression may provide a biased estimate of
the consumer's implicit price for the characteristic, as Feenstra (1995) pointed out.
Therefore, the hedonic regression should be modi¯ed in order to take into account
the di®erence between the price and the marginal cost.
Recently, this matter was challenged by Pakes (2003).16 He argued that, in
the Bertand equilibrium of (di®erentiated) oligopolistic markets, the hedonic regres-
sion represents the expectation of the marginal cost of a producer plus a market
power function of the distribution of consumers' preferences and the characteristics
of competing products. So, the coe±cients have \no obvious interpretation in terms
of economic primitives" (Pakes 2003., p.1581).
In this paper, we follow Pakes, and do not worry about the \coe±cient bias"
of the estimated hedonic regression. We thus interpret the hedonic regression es-
timating the conditional expectation of marginal cost and markup given the char-
acteristics, which is approximated in the sense of minimizing mean squared error
by the linear combination of characteristics with appropriate transformation of the
dependent variables (prices) and the independent variables (characteristics).
Given this view of hedonic regression in \reduced form", the focus is not on
the estimated coe±cients but on the price indexes generated by the hedonic regres-
sion. Even if there are large markups in the markets, an unbiased estimate of price
indexes can be obtained from the hedonic regression, although the coe±cients are
not interpreted as measures of either consumers' marginal evaluations or producers'
marginal costs.
computed the quality-adjusted price of mobile phone handsets and found that the results do not
change much when the quantity weight is included. The results are available from authors upon
request.
16See Anstine (2004) for an excellent discussion of this matter. In a more general context, Benkard
and Bajari (2005) proposed the use of factor analysis methods to correct the bias due to unobserved
characteristics.
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5 Estimation Results
5.1 Hedonic Regression
Table 3 presents the estimation results of the aggregated carriers for some main char-
acteristics. Prices are de°ated by the Japanese GDP de°ator (base period = the
¯rst quarter of 2002). (See Watanabe et al. 2009 for the entire estimation results.)
As indicated by the sign change, estimates of some coe±cients (those of camera res-
olution and age) are stable over time while the estimates of other coe±cients (those
of speed, screen, and battery duration) are unstable. For example, the transmission
speeds have a signi¯cant positive impact on handset prices in the earlier periods but
their e®ect starts to vary after around 2005. Although not presented in the table,
the estimated coe±cients of the binary variables are also unstable (sign reversals).
Table 3: Regression Results: All Carriers for Selected Variables
Periods log(speed) log(camera) log(screen) log(duration) age time dummy N ¹R2
02Q1 {02Q2 0.197 0.040 -0.109 ¡¡ -0.040 -0.006
(0.024) (0.017) (0.133) (0.006) (0.007) 338 0.959
02Q2 {02Q3 0.425 0.003 -0.545 0.936 -0.072 -0.025
(0.060) (0.048) (0.143) (0.215) (0.006) (0.007) 463 0.889
02Q3 {02Q4 0.197 0.054 0.142 0.081 -0.057 -0.085
(0.030) (0.023) (0.034) (0.049) (0.006) (0.008) 662 0.733
02Q4 {03Q1 0.067 0.059 -0.054 0.030 -0.103 -0.045
(0.011) (0.016) (0.022) (0.051) (0.006) (0.009) 895 0.595
03Q1 {03Q2 0.054 0.042 -0.038 0.150 -0.079 -0.059
(0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.061) (0.006) (0.008) 1005 0.664
03Q2 {03Q3 0.111 0.039 -0.011 0.575 -0.068 -0.079
(0.012) (0.009) (0.013) (0.067) (0.004) (0.006) 1311 0.798
03Q3 {03Q4 0.131 0.060 -0.004 0.560 -0.062 -0.021
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.050) (0.003) (0.005) 1676 0.776
03Q4 {04Q1 0.077 0.058 0.026 -0.027 -0.074 0.013
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.054) (0.004) (0.006) 1704 0.705
04Q1 {04Q2 0.076 0.089 0.090 -0.285 -0.086 -0.090
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.044) (0.003) (0.005) 1816 0.765
04Q2 {04Q3 0.071 0.079 0.056 -0.199 -0.078 -0.040
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.038) (0.003) (0.006) 2246 0.718
04Q3 {04Q4 0.043 0.031 -0.020 -0.084 -0.065 -0.037
(0.005) (0.007) (0.012) (0.037) (0.003) (0.006) 2324 0.648
04Q4 {05Q1 0.018 0.019 -0.029 -0.080 -0.046 0.008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.036) (0.003) (0.006) 2245 0.629
05Q1 {05Q2 -0.031 0.067 -0.038 -0.142 -0.046 -0.041
(0.008) (0.009) (0.019) (0.038) (0.004) (0.006) 2168 0.646
05Q2 {05Q3 -0.002 0.129 0.141 -0.139 -0.055 -0.048
(0.009) (0.010) (0.023) (0.035) (0.003) (0.005) 2293 0.679
05Q3 {05Q4 0.050 0.132 0.249 -0.291 -0.065 -0.040
(0.007) (0.009) (0.025) (0.033) (0.003) (0.005) 2423 0.682
05Q4 {06Q1 0.039 0.140 0.448 -0.269 -0.076 -0.057
(0.007) (0.010) (0.037) (0.042) (0.003) (0.006) 2480 0.596
06Q1 {06Q2 0.039 0.140 0.448 -0.269 -0.076 -0.057
(0.007) (0.010) (0.037) (0.042) (0.003) (0.006) 2480 0.596
06Q2 {06Q3 -0.029 0.131 -0.004 0.255 -0.082 -0.002
(0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.037) (0.002) (0.004) 3392 0.640
06Q3 {06Q4 -0.030 0.088 -0.056 0.251 -0.057 -0.033
(0.007) (0.009) (0.015) (0.036) (0.002) (0.005) 3324 0.545
06Q4 {07Q1 0.014 0.053 -0.107 0.152 -0.039 -0.057
(0.006) (0.009) (0.029) (0.026) (0.003) (0.006) 3364 0.475
07Q1 {07Q2 -0.003 0.053 0.008 0.055 -0.042 0.014
(0.005) (0.008) (0.020) (0.016) (0.002) (0.004) 4004 0.505
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Boldfaced values are signi¯cant at .05.
Following the argument of Pakes, however, the instability and reversals of signs
of the estimated coe±cients are \neither unusual results for hedonic regression nor
a particular source of worry" (Pakes 2003, p.1587). As presented, in an imperfectly
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competitive market, the coe±cient of a characteristic no longer represents an implicit
price; instead, it represents a marginal cost function plus a markup function that
resulted from the optimization behavior of consumers and producers in a market
with product di®erentiation. In what follows, therefore, we opt for not interpreting
the coe±cients of characteristics.
Given that our interest is in the price index generated by the hedonic regressions,
we need to take into account its mean and variance. We focus on the adjusted R-
squares of hedonic regressions, because they are closely associated with the mean
squared error of the price prediction. Table 3 shows that the adjusted R-squares
have average ¹R2 = 0:68, so the model is generally well speci¯ed using the standards
of previous studies of hedonic price indexes.17
One concern is that the goodness-of-¯t measure in the adjusted R-square de-
clines from 0:96 to 0:48, and this might suggest misspeci¯cation may arise.18 To
account for the possibility of unobserved characteristics, we allow for carrier-speci¯c
heterogeneity in the hedonic regression.19 For this purpose, we start by examining
whether data should be aggregated or disaggregated over carriers. We ¯rst imple-
ment an F test of the null hypothesis that the coe±cients of the hedonic regressions
are all equal across carriers. F tests are carried out for the all-period-pooled hedonic
regression and for each adjacent period hedonic regression. In all cases, we found
that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% signi¯cance level.
We further implement a recursive F test, as described above, to examine the
stability of the coe±cients of the hedonic regression over time. Because the test re-
sults above implied that the sample should be disaggregated by carrier, the recursive
F tests were implemented for each sample of carriers, NTT, KDDI, and SoftBank
respectively. Again, we found that no more than two adjacent periods are pooled
for any of the three carriers. All these tests indicated that hedonic regressions for
each carrier should be estimated by pooling two adjacent periods.
Table 4 reports the adjusted R-squares for the aggregated and disaggregated
carrier samples. As presented, the goodness-of-¯t measures improve substantially
17For example, Pakes (2003) examined many functional forms in the hedonic regression and
reported ¹R2s for PCs that ranged from 0:26 to 0:52.
18We included in our estimation as extensive a set of handset characteristics as possible given the
information available to us. Nontheless, there might be unobserved characteristics that correspond
more directly to the subscribers' individual preferences that may cuase the declining tendency of
the adjusted R-square. For example, it is hard to quantify the \design" of a handset as a variable
in our estimation given the information available. Such factors may be important for consumers'
determination of whether or not to purchase a handset, and thus they can be incorporated in the
handset prices.
19We also took care of manufacturer-speci¯c unobserved factors in the hedonic regressions by
adding dummy variables for all 22 manufacturers.
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Table 4: Adjusted R-squares for Hedonic Regressions
Periods All Carriers NTT KDDI SoftBank
02Q1-02Q2 0.96 0.86 0.87 0.91
02Q2-02Q3 0.89 0.83 0.64 0.90
02Q3-02Q4 0.73 0.75 0.89 0.87
02Q4-03Q1 0.60 0.67 0.84 0.84
03Q1-03Q2 0.66 0.72 0.73 0.74
03Q2-03Q3 0.80 0.81 0.70 0.79
03Q3-03Q4 0.78 0.76 0.67 0.80
03Q4-04Q1 0.70 0.74 0.77 0.88
04Q1-04Q2 0.76 0.84 0.71 0.83
04Q2-04Q3 0.72 0.89 0.66 0.73
04Q3-04Q4 0.65 0.86 0.59 0.66
04Q4-05Q1 0.63 0.87 0.54 0.85
05Q1-05Q2 0.65 0.83 0.65 0.82
05Q2-05Q3 0.68 0.86 0.48 0.74
05Q3-05Q4 0.68 0.83 0.63 0.80
05Q4-06Q1 0.60 0.78 0.57 0.85
06Q1-06Q2 0.60 0.85 0.64 0.83
06Q2-06Q3 0.64 0.82 0.56 0.90
06Q3-06Q4 0.55 0.79 0.46 0.70
06Q4-07Q1 0.47 0.59 0.66 0.53
07Q1-07Q2 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.66
Average 0.68 0.78 0.65 0.79
for NTT and SoftBank, with averages 0:78 and 0:79, respectively, while those for
KDDI become slightly worse, with an average of 0:65, compared to those for aggre-
gated carrier data, which have an average of 0:68. This suggests that we may not
have controlled for some important factors that determine the prices of a handset,
especially for KDDI handsets.
For example, we cannot control \design" as a determinant of the handset price.
It is hard to quantify such a factor given the information available, but the factor
may be important for consumers' determination of whether to purchase a hand-
set. According to a business anecdote, KDDI was successful in the mid-2000s in
attracting new subscribers, in particular teenagers, by headhunting competent in-
dustrial designers and creating elegantly designed mobile phone handsets. We are
thus obliged to acknowledge that missing factors may bias the quality-adjusted prices
of handsets, especially for those of KDDI.
5.2 Carriers' Strategies on QAPs
Fig. 3 presents the estimated QAPs of the mobile phone handsets sold in Japan
between 2002 and mid-2007. It is clear that the QAP decreased steadily during this
period. The consistent decrease in the QAP contrasts remarkably with the widely
°uctuating average handset price depicted in Fig. 1.
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Figure 3: Estimated QAPs of Handsets for All Carriers
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The classic explanation for a decreasing trend in QAP is the obsolescence e®ect
on the values of existing products due to technological progress: The introduction
of new models with higher functions and quality lowers the value of the monopolist
carrier's old models.20 To give a theoretical foundation for this explanation, Fish-
man and Rob (2002) endogenized technological progress as a monopolist's decision
problem on its dynamic R&D investment.
In oligopolistic markets, however, the introduction of such new models lowers the
value of rivals' models as well. The QAP given by (7) is not suitable for capturing
this business stealing e®ect, because it is not directly comparable across carriers but
only measures the relative change in QAPs of the same carrier's handsets. Thus, we
examine another measure, the absolute QAP, which explicitly allows for the initial
price di®erence among carriers in the base period.
Denote by ¹pk0 the average price of carrier k's handsets in the base period t = 0
and by ®^ks the estimated coe±cient of the dummy variable Ds in hedonic regression
(6) for carrier k. The absolute QAP of carrier k's handsets in period t is de¯ned by
\AQAP
k
t = ¹p
k
0
tY
s=1
exp(®^ks): (8)
For the remaining part of this subsection we will refer to the absolute QAP as simply
the QAP.
The decreasing trend in estimated absolute QAP can be seen in Fig. 4. The
QAPs of NTT handsets were more expensive than those of KDDI and SoftBank
handsets. NTT has nevertheless retained a remarkably large market share, more
20We measure the \age" of a handset to capture the obsolescence e®ect on its price. See Table 2.
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Figure 4: Estimated Absolute QAPs of Handsets
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au by KDDI
than 50% of subscribers, throughout the study period. From 2003 to 2005 the
KDDI QAPs decreased from quarter to quarter, enlarging the di®erence in QAPs
between NTT and KDDI handsets.21 During this period, KDDI gained many more
subscribers and NTT lost market share.22 NTT might have been reluctant to de-
crease the QAPs of its handsets due to the pro¯tability of having the largest market
share.
The QAPs of both KDDI and SoftBank handsets decreased more rapidly than
that of NTT handsets. This is understandable because, as well as against NTT with
its remarkably large market share, these two smaller carriers were ¯ercely competing
against each other to gain the remaining share. We can observe in Fig. 4 the di®erent
overall patterns and the asynchronous timing of these two carriers' decisions to make
large decreases in their QAPs.
A carrier can gain more subscribers by the business-stealing e®ect of large re-
ductions of QAP relative to that of a ¯ercely competing rival. Accordingly, a large
decrease in QAP by a carrier roughly simultaneous with a large decrease by such
a rival will not much a®ect its relative subscriber share, and thus may not be the
best strategy for either carrier, particularly if the introduction of higher-performing
models requires considerable development cost, in addition to the cost of advertising
the new lower QAP.
Large asynchronous decreases in QAP generate a clear turnover cycle in QAPs
between KDDI and SoftBank handsets, the ¯rst turnover occurring in the ¯rst quar-
ter of 2004, and the second one occurring in the ¯rst quarter of 2007. The QAP
21KDDI started various new services in December of 2002 and had completely shifted to the 3G
mobile communication system by the end of 2005. See footnote 7 for details.
22The market share fell below 50% in March 2008.
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Table 5: Granger-causality Tests for First Di®erenced absolute QAPs
Null Hypothesis Critical Probability
KDDI does not Granger-cause NTT 0.0900 (rejected)
SoftBank does not Granger-cause NTT 0.5411 (accepted)
NTT does not Granger-cause KDD I 0.1274 (accepted)
SoftBank does not Granger-cause KDDI 0.0740 (rejected)
NTT does not Granger-cause SoftBank 0.6597 (accepted)
KDDI does not Granger-cause SoftBank 0.5313 (accepted)
Note: The Toda-Yamamoto's augmented Granger-causality tests are car-
ried out based on the VAR model of absolute QAPs with four lags, where
k = 3 and dmax = 1. Critical probabilities are provided. The rejection of
null hypothesis is based on 10% signi¯cance level.
gap between the two carriers' handsets grew larger from the third quarter of 2002
to the fourth quarter of 2003, and then started to shrink. After the ¯rst turnover,
the QAP gap again grew continuously larger in the ¯rst quarter of 2005, and then
started to shrink in the fourth quarter of 2006.
To investigate the strategic interaction of carriers' QAPs, we implemented Granger-
causality tests. The pre-tests of unit roots (augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-
Perron) consistently suggested that all the QAPs are integrated of order one, I(1).23
As is known in the literature (e.g., Toda and Phillips 1993), if the endogenous
variables are integrated, the standard Granger-causality test based on level vector
autoregression (VAR) is invalid. We thus use a variant of the Granger-causality
test proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995), which is robust to the integration or
cointegration properties of the process.24
Toda and Yamamoto's augmented Granger-causality test is carried out by the
following steps: (1) the lag length k of the VAR of endogenous variables and the
maximal order dmax of integration are determined, (2) a level VAR of the variables
is estimated with a total p = k+ dmax lags, and (3) the standard Granger-causality
test is implemented based on the estimated VAR with p lags.
For the system of the carriers' QAPs, the Consistent AIC proposed by Bozdogan
(1987), a small-sample corrected AIC, suggests that k = 3, up to four lags, for the
sample size in 22 periods.25 Given that the unit root tests suggested dmax = 1, we
23The results are not reported but are available upon request.
24The vector error correction model, VECM, is an alternative method. VECMs, however, need
more degrees of freedom, and thus we could not choose it, faced with the limited sample size of
QAPs.
25Due to the small sample size relative to the number of model parameters, we use the Consistent
AIC, which imposes a greater sample size penalty on the log-likelihood than the original AIC
criterion, and therefore tends to favor more parsimonious models. The small-sample corrected AIC
was ¯rst proposed by Sugiura (1978) as c-AIC, and revised by Hurvich and Tsai (1989). Bozdogan
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estimated the VAR model of the QAPs with p = 4 lags, and implement the standard
Granger-causality tests.26
The results of the Toda-Yamamoto's augmented Granger-causality test, shown
in Table 5, suggest that the QAPs of a carrier's handsets should be in°uenced by
those of the carrier that is next lower ranked in the market share. If SoftBank's
share exceeds KDDI's in the future, the direction of causality may become reversed.
Then we could say that the reversal statistically con¯rms the complete turnover
cycle between KDDI and SoftBank's QAPs.
6 Final Remarks
A decreasing trend in QAP has been reported for new cars (Griliches 1961), software
packages (Gandal 1994), personal computers (Nelson et al. 1994; Berndt et al. 1995),
mainframe computers (Brown 2000), and PDAs (Chwelos et al. 2008). Faced with
limited sample sizes, these empirical studies all examined the whole market, and
found that QAP decreases rapidly during the early stages of the introduction of a
new product, and then the rate decrease tapers o®, or that the faster new products
are introduced, the faster the rate of decrease in their QAPs. Our larger data set
allowed us in this study to consider the strategic interactions among carriers in view
of changes in the QAPs of their mobile phone handsets.
In this paper we con¯ned our analysis to the changes in QAPs of handsets, yet
there are many other aspects of carriers' strategies in need of examination, for ex-
ample, the service contents, regulations, and pricing systems. Grzybowski (2005)
reported that the introduction of mobile number portability has a negative impact
on prices of mobile communication services in the EU countries.27 According to
Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) and Lambrecht et al. (2006), complicated pricing sys-
tems will bias consumers' choices of services. These aspects are all closely connected
to carriers' product and marketing strategies.
Finally, it would be interesting to evaluate how new pricing systems recently es-
tablished by carriers in°uenced the QAPs of their mobile phone handsets in Japan.
As noted in Sect. 2, the Ministry of Internal A®airs and Communications recom-
mended that mobile phone carriers lessen their heavy dependency on price subsidies
by 2010, and the carriers started establishing new pricing rules; they ¯rst reduced
base call charges by half in September 2007. This is left for future research.
(1987) proposed the Consistent AIC as another correction and showed the theoretical and empirical
advantages of the Consistent AIC over the AIC in small samples.
26The results are not reported but are available upon request.
27In Japan, mobile number portability was introduced in October 2006.
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